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Abstract. This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a
certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking
procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it
is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the filled ballot paper
profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner
is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore
the properties of the designed ranking procedure.
Keywords: ranked election, ballot paper, tournament matrix, cooperative
game, Shapley value.
1. Introduction
The present paper focuses on the ranking problem of candidates for
a certain position based on ballot papers filled by their supporters. Such
problem arises during elections of a president, a company’s CEO, a professor
in a chair and many other positions. By an assumption, elections are free,
honest and open. In the course of voting, electors fill ballot papers and specify
their preferences for existing candidates. Generally, the number of ballot
papers appreciably exceeds the number of candidates. The winner is defined
on the basis of all filled ballot papers. Here a major role belongs to the winner
selection method. This ballot paper handling technique must possess a series
of positive properties. We will believe that elections choose an appropriate
candidate from at least two ones. Voters have to fill a ballot paper and specify
their relative preferences for given candidates. As a matter of fact, there exist
different ways of ballot paper filling.
In the case of majority voting, electors have to specify a most preferable
candidate. The winner is the candidate receiving the simple majority of votes.
This voting rule appears widespread, has easy numerical implementation
and requires reasonable computations. However, it neglects voting aspects
in situations when several candidates are equally preferable for electors.
Under approval voting, an elector specifies only trusted candidates (see
Brams, Fishburn 1978, 2005). Therefore, each voter assigns 1 to trusted
candidates and 0 to others. The candidate with the maximum number of
labels 1 wins the elections. This voting rule demonstrates higher complexity
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and insensitivity to the existing preferences of electors. The idea with three
labels 0, 1, 2 was pioneered in the paper (Hillinger 2005). An axiomatization
of such score voting procedures (evaluating voting rules) was suggested in
(Gaertner, Xu 2012).
Moreover, there exist range voting rules, where each candidate receives
an evaluation from 0 to 100 (W.D.Smith 2000). The numerical implementation
of this procedure causes no difficulties, either; but it is relatively insensitive
to the preferences for candidates.
According to the majority judgement approach, each candidate is
associated with some group of preferences, e.g., A,B,C,D, . . . (Balinski,
Laraki 2007). Such method depends on the number of groups and entails
difficulties in the course of ballot paper handling, but seems computationally
easy.
Ranked elections dictate placing all candidates in a ballot paper in
the descending order of voter’s preferences. This method reflects the existing
preferences of all voters for candidates in the most accurate way. Several
techniques to count the votes are applicable here, and they have different
sensitivity to possible variations in voters’ preferences.
In this work, we examine ranking procedures. Consider given sets of
candidates {a, b, c, . . . } and voters {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each voter fills a ballot
paper by ranking all candidates in the descending order of its preferences.
It is required to define the winner based on the filled ballot papers. There
exist a series of procedures for ballot papers handling and winner choice;
in this context, we mention the majority rule, the procedures suggested by
Borda and Copeland (see Klamler 2006), as well as the sequential pairwise
comparison procedure and dictatorship voting. In certain cases, it is necessary
to define several winners, e.g., to choose a management committee or a
team for a project. Here a possible approach is to address the minimax and
minisum procedures (Brams, et al. 2007, Kilgour 2010).
The present paper suggests involving some methods of cooperative game
theory as ballot paper handling procedures. The idea is to construct a special-
form characteristic function of such game using filled ballot papers, with
subsequent weighting of each player (e.g., by the Shapley value). The stated
procedure enjoys remarkable properties, as it takes into account not just the
correlation of two candidates, but the correlation of any candidates depending
on their belonging to certain coalitions. The procedure yields weights for all
candidates and is therefore applicable to models, where one has to choose a
group of winning candidates (instead of a single winner).
2. The ranking procedure
Consider the voting problem, where n ≥ 2 electors have to choose a
winner among m ≥ 2 candidates. The preferences of each voter are defined
by a linear order on the set of candidates. Denote by A = {a, b, c, . . .} and P =
2
{1, 2, . . . , n} the sets of candidates and voters, respectively. Based on joint
preferences, a voting procedure (comprising a ballot paper and a counting
rule of votes) leads to a result of voting. A voting procedure aims at assigning
ranks from 1 to m to all candidates; note that such ranking can be nonstrict.
Below we give an example of a voting procedure with 45 electors and 5
candidates.
Example 1. There are n = 45 voters and m = 5 candidates. The existing
preferences of voters are defined by the following table.
Preference profile
5 5 8 3 7 2 7 8
a a b c c c d e
c d e a a b c b
b e d b e a e a
e c a e b d b d
d b c d d e a c
Designate by h(i, j) the number of ballot papers, where candidate i is
preferable to candidate j. Let us compile a matrix from the values of the
function h(i, j). Such matrix is called a tournament matrix. For instance,
the tournament matrix in Example 1 takes the following form.
Tournament matrix
a b c d e
a 20 26 30 22
b 25 16 33 18
c 19 29 17 24
d 15 12 28 14
e 23 27 21 31
Generally, tournament matrices serve for the final choice of winners. In
the sequel, we will construct characteristic functions mostly using tournament
matrices. It is desired that the existing procedures of ballot paper handling
and winner definition meet a series of properties.
Unanimity. If each voter ranks candidate x not lower than candidate y,
then the former appears not lower than the latter in the collective preference.
Candidate x is termed the Condorcet winner if x beats any other candidate
in the case of pairwise comparison. This means that for any y ∈ A\ {x} over
one-half of the voters rank x higher than y, i.e., h(x, y) > n/2.
The Condorcet property. If a candidate is the Condorcet winner, then
it ranks first in the collective preference.
Monotonicity. Suppose that in its individual preference a voter moves
candidate x by one position up (down) under a fixed ranking of all other
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candidates; then in the collective preference x does not decrease (increase,
respectively) its rank.
These properties will be supplemented by a couple of new ones for the
ranking procedures suggested below.
Denote by w(x) and l(x) the sets of candidates loosing to and winning
against candidate x, respectively, in the case of pairwise comparison. Interestingly,
candidate x represents the Condorcet winner iff w(x) = A\{x} and l(x) = ∅.
The strong Condorcet property. If w(x) ⊇ w(y), l(x) ⊆ l(y) and
h(x, y) > n/2, then in the collective preference candidate x ranks not lower
than candidate y.
The majority rule. For any initial preference profile and any order of
candidates a1 > a2 > ... > am, there exists an integer number N such that
after adding k ≥ N ballot papers with the given order of candidates the new
preference profile yields a collective ranking coinciding with the ranking in
the group of added ballot papers.
Lemma 1. A ranking procedure meeting the strong Condorcet property also
satisfies the majority rule.
To prove Lemma 1, it suffices to observe the following fact. Adding
identical ballot papers with the order a1 > a2 > ... > am, whose number
exceeds by 1 the initial number of ballot papers, brings to the collective
ranking a1 > a2 > ... > am.
In the forthcoming sections, we will check these properties for a new
ranking procedure. This procedure involves a certain cooperative game associated
with the filled ballot paper profile.
Let K ⊆ A indicate a coalition of candidates. Suppose that each coalition
K is assigned with a nonnegative monotonous function v(K) (a characteristic
function in the terminology of cooperative game theory). Find the characteristic
function v(K) for a given voter preference profile. Then candidate ranking
can be performed on the basis of cooperative game theory criteria adopted in
voting problems analysis. In the sequel, the role of such criterion belongs to
the candidate’s power in the form of the Shapley value. In this case, candidate
ranking runs according to the Shapley values for a given characteristic function.
First, we will define characteristic functions using tournament matrices.
3. Characteristic function as the value of a constant-
sum game
Define the characteristic function as follows. Consider a coalition K and
its complement A \ K. Assume that the coalition K proposes for elections
a common candidate i ∈ K, whereas the coalition A \ K nominates its
representative j ∈ A \ K. The candidate receiving over half of the votes
becomes the winner; otherwise, the elections are drawn. The payoff in this
game makes up
H(i, j) = I
(
h(i, j)−
n
2
)
,
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where the indicator function I(z) = 1 for z > 0, I(z) = 1/2 for z = 0 and 0
for the rest values of z.
This mixed strategy game has an equilibrium according to the Nash
theorem; moreover, its value gives the value of the characteristic function
v(K) in the cooperative game.
Therefore, the payoff v(K) of the coalitionK makes the equilibrium payoff
in the constant-sum game of the coalition K against the countercoalition
A \ K. A mixed strategy of the coalition K is a vector p = (pi)i∈K . The
coalitionK proposes its common candidate i ∈ K with the probability pi ≥ 0,
where
∑
i∈K
pi = 1. A strategy of the coalition A \K is a vector q = (qj)j∈A\K
such that qj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ A\K, where
∑
j∈A\K
qj = 1. Then the characteristic
function v acquires the form
v(K) = max
p
min
q
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈A\K
H(i, j)piqj .
Note that
v(K) + v(A \K) = 1.
For instance, calculate the payoff v for the coalitions ac and bde in Example 1.
The payoff matrix of the coalition ac against the coalition bde is defined by
( b d e
a 0 1 0
c 1 0 1
)
.
In mixed strategies, the coalition ac has the payoff 0.5; hence, v(ac) =
v(bde) = 0.5.
A coalition wins at least by 23 affirmative votes. The coalitions ce, abe
and acd are minimal winning coalitions. Candidates c and e possess the
highest power under such voting procedure. Any winning coalition must
include candidate c or e.
The characteristic function can be calculated for all 2m coalitions of
candidates. After construction of the characteristic function, it is possible
to evaluate the candidate’s power using the Shapley value:
ϕx(v) =
∑
K:x 6∈K
k!(m− k − 1)!
m!
(v(K ∪ x)− v(K)) , x ∈ A.
The Appendix provides the corresponding table with all values for the
characteristic function v in Example 1.
The Shapley value for the characteristic function in Example 1.
a b c d e ranking
v 0.167 0.083 0.333 0.083 0.333 e = c > a > b = d
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Further exposition employs two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let (hij) be a payoff matrix of dimensions n×m in the constant-
sum game with a value v∗. Then the game with a matrix ĥ such that ĥij ≥ hij
for all i, j has a value not smaller than v∗.
Proof.
Designate by p∗ and q∗ any optimal strategies of players 1 and 2 in the
game with the matrix h. It suffices to show that in the game with the matrix
ĥ the strategy p∗ guarantees to player 1 a payoff not less than v∗. Imagine
that there exists a strategy q of player 2 such that the payoff of its opponent
is smaller than v∗. In this case,
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗i qj ĥij < v
∗ ≤
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗i qjhij ,
which is impossible under ĥij ≥ hij.
Lemma 3. Suppose that for some pair of candidates x, y and any coalition
S ⊆ A \ {x, y} the characteristic functions v and v̂ meet the following
conditions:
v(S) = v̂(S),
v(S ∪ y) ≥ v̂(S ∪ y),
v(S ∪ x) ≤ v̂(S ∪ x),
v(S ∪ y ∪ x) = v̂(S ∪ y ∪ x).
Then transition from v to v̂ does not decrease the Shapley value ϕx for
candidate x and does not increase the Shapley value ϕy for candidate y. For
any other candidate z ∈ A\{x, y}, the Shapley value increment ϕz(v̂)−ϕz(v)
is not greater than the increment ϕx(v̂)−ϕx(v) for x and not smaller than the
increment ϕy(v̂)− ϕy(v) for y. Consequently, candidate x does not decrease
its rank and candidate y does not increase its rank in the collective preference
as the result of replacing the characteristic function v by v̂.
Proof.
The premises of the lemma directly imply that the Shapley value does
not decrease (increase) for candidate x (for candidate y, respectively). Now,
demonstrate that for any other candidate z ∈ A \ {x, y} the Shapley value
increment does not exceed that for x.
For this, estimate the quantities
ϕx(v̂)−ϕx(v)=
∑
K:x 6∈K
k!(m−k−1)!
m!
(v̂(K ∪ x)−v̂(K))−(v(K ∪ x)−v(K)) (1)
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and
ϕz(v̂)−ϕz(v)=
∑
K:z 6∈K
k!(m−k−1)!
m!
(v̂(K∪z)−v̂(K))−(v(K∪z)−v(K))). (2)
Introduce the notation
∆K(x) = (v̂(K ∪ x)− v̂(K))− (v(K ∪ x)− v(K)).
If x, z 6∈ K, then for y 6∈ K we have
v̂(x ∪K)− v̂(K)− (v(x ∪K)− v(K)) = v̂(x ∪K)− v(x ∪K) ≥ 0.
At the same time,
v̂(z ∪K)− v̂(K)− (v(z ∪K)− v(K)) = 0.
This dictates that ∆K(x) ≥ ∆K(z). On the other hand, if y ∈ K, the
inequalities
v̂(x ∪K)− v̂(K)− (v(x ∪K)− v(K)) = v(K)− v̂(K) ≥ 0,
v̂(z ∪K)− v̂(K)− (v(z ∪K)− v(K)) =
= v̂(z ∪ y ∪ (K \ y))− v(z ∪ y ∪ (K \ y))− (v̂(K)− v(K)) ≤ v(K)− v̂(K),
again yield ∆K(x) ≥ ∆K(z).
Next, consider the coalitions K in the sum (1), which contain player z.
Associate them with the coalitions K ′ = x ∪ (K \ z) in the sum (2). The
inequalities below hold true depending on whether player y belongs to this
coalition or not.
If y 6∈ K, then
∆x(K) = v̂(x ∪K)− v̂(K)− (v(x ∪K)− v(K)) =
= v̂(x ∪K)− v(x ∪K)) ≥ 0,
whereas
∆z(K
′) = v̂(z ∪K ′)− v̂(K ′)− (v(z ∪K ′)− v(K ′)) =
= v̂(z ∪ x∪ (K \ z))− v̂(x∪ (K \ z))− (v(z ∪ x∪ (K \ z))− v(x∪ (K \ z))) ≤
≤ v̂(x ∪K)− v(x ∪K) = ∆x(K).
In the case of y ∈ K, we obtain
∆x(K) = v̂(x∪y∪(K \y))−v̂(y∪(K \y))−(v(x∪y∪(K \y))−v(y∪(K \y)) =
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= v(y ∪ (K \ y))−v̂(y ∪ (K \ y))≥0,
whereas
∆z(K
′) = v̂(z ∪K ′)− v̂(K ′)− (v(z ∪K ′)− v(K ′)) =
= v̂(x ∪K)− v̂(x ∪ (K \ z))− (v(x ∪K))− v(x ∪ (K \ z))) = 0.
Hence, it appears that ∆x(K) ≥ ∆z(K
′). Thus, we have established that
ϕx(v̂)− ϕx(v) ≥ ϕz(v̂)− ϕz(v).
Similarly, it is possible to demonstrate that that the Shapley value increment
for y does not exceed that for z. Summarizing the outcomes, we have argued
that candidate x (candidate y) does not decrease (increase, respectively) its
rank in the collective preference as the characteristic function v is replaced
by v̂.
Theorem 1. The characteristic function v is nonnegative and monotonous.
Ranking based on the Shapley value for the function v enjoys the properties
of unanimity and monotonicity, the majority rule, the Condorcet and strong
Condorcet properties.
Proof. The nonnegativity and monotonicity of the function v is obvious
from the definition. Note that, under an odd number of voters, this function
possesses the superadditive property.
First, we show the property of unanimity. Suppose that candidate x is
preferable to candidate y for all voters. It suffices to verify the inequality
v(y∪S) ≤ v(x∪S) for any coalition S ⊆ A\{x, y}. Denote K = A\{x, y}\S.
Interestingly, h(i, x) ≤ h(i, y) and h(y, j) ≤ h(x, j) for any i, j. This means
that H(i, x) ≤ H(i, y) and H(y, j) ≤ H(x, j) for any i, j. Compare the payoff
matrix of the coalition y ∪ S against x ∪K


x k1 . . . kr
y 0 H(y, k1) . . . H(y, kr)
s1 H(s1, x) H(s1, k1) . . . H(s1, kr)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sl H(sl, x) H(sl, k1) . . . H(sl, kr)

 (3)
with the payoff matrix of the coalition x ∪ S against y ∪K


y k1 . . . kr
x 1 H(x, k1) . . . H(x, kr)
s1 H(s1, y) H(s1, k1) . . . H(s1, kr)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sl H(sl, y) H(sl, k1) . . . H(sl, kr)

 (4)
Clearly, elements in the lower matrix are not smaller than their counterparts
in the upper matrix. By virtue of Lemma 2, we have v(y ∪ S) ≤ v(x ∪ S).
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And so, the Shapley value for candidate x is not less than that for candidate
y.
Next, let us prove the monotonicity of the ranking procedure. Assume that
in a ballot paper candidate x moves by one position up, whereas candidate
y goes by one position down. Designate by v̂ the characteristic function
resulting from such transformation. Obviously, for any coalition S ⊆ A\{x, y}
the conditions of Lemma 3 take place. According to Lemma 3, candidate
x (candidate y) does not decrease (increase, respectively) its rank in the
collective preference.
Third, check the Condorcet property. Imagine that candidate x represents
the Condorcet winner and compare it with any other candidate y. For any
set S ⊆ A\ {x, y}, the coalition x∪S proposes the common candidate x and
wins. Consequently, we have
1 = v(x ∪ S) > v(y ∪ S) = 0,
whence it follows that the Shapley value is higher for candidate x than for
candidate y.
And finally, establish the strong Condorcet property. Let w(x) ⊇ w(y),
l(x) ⊆ l(y) and h(x, y) > n/2. Then I(h(i, x)− n
2
) ≤ I(h(i, y)− n
2
), I(h(y, j)−
n
2
) ≤ I(h(x, j)− n
2
) for any i, j. Verify the inequality v(y ∪ S) ≤ v(x∪ S) for
any set S ⊆ A \ {x, y}. Designate K = A \ {x, y} \ S. The payoff matrices of
the coalition y∪S against x∪K coincide with the matrices (3) and (4), see the
proof of unanimity. Then Lemma 2 brings to the condition v(y∪S) ≤ v(x∪S).
Consequently, for candidate x the Shapley value is not less than for candidate
y.
The function v satisfies the strong Condorcet property, ergo the majority
rule (see Lemma 1). This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
The characteristic function v takes into account merely the win of one
candidate over another under pairwise comparison. Here the advantage of one
vote and unanimity are equivalent. Such ranking method reflects candidate’s
capability for creating coalitions that propose the Condorcet winner. If the
Condorcet winner is among all candidates, the Shapley value vector makes
up (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Remark. We have defined the value of the characteristic function as the
value of a constant-sum game with mixed strategies. An alternative approach
is to introduce the characteristic function in terms of pure strategies only.
Then its value in the game of a coalition K against the countercoalition A\K
becomes
v(K) = max
i∈K
min
j∈A\K
H(i, j).
Note that Theorem 1 remains in force for such characteristic function, either.
4. Ranking based on tournament matrix
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To calculate the function v, we have utilized the payoff matrix composed
of zeros and unities. In what follows, let us estimate the advantage of one
candidate over another in a more accurate way. As previously, consider the
constant-sum game of a coalition K against the countercoalition A \ K.
Each coalition proposes a common candidate. By assumption, the payoff of
a coalition is the number of votes h(i, j) polled by common candidate i ∈ K
against common candidate j ∈ A \K.
For the coalition K, the payoff u(K) is its equilibrium payoff in the game
against the countercoalition A \K. In this case, the optimal strategy of the
coalition K (i.e., choosing common candidate i ∈ K) may appear mixed.
A mixed strategy of the coalition K represents a vector p = (pi)i∈K . A
strategy of the coalition A \K forms a vector q = (qj)j∈A\K . Therefore, the
characteristic function is defined by
u(K) = max
p
min
q
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈A\K
h(i, j)piqj .
For any coalition K, we have the equality
u(K) + u(A \K) = n.
For instance, revert to Example 1 and find the values of the function u
for the coalitions ac and bde. The payoff matrix of the coalition ac against
the coalition bde takes the form
( b d e
a 20 30 22
c 29 17 24
)
.
For the coalition ac, common candidate a guarantees 20 votes against b,
whereas candidate c ensures 17 votes against d. For the coalition bde, common
candidates b, d and e guarantee 45-29=16 votes against c, 45-30=15 votes
against a and 45-24=21 votes against c, respectively. Here the guaranteed
payoffs under mixed strategies constitute u(ac) = 20 and u(bde) = 45−24 =
21. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the coalition ac uses probabilities for
the strategies (7/15, 8/15), and the coalition bde does same for the strategies
(0, 2/15, 13/15). The corresponding payoffs are u(ac) = 346/15 ≈ 23.07 and
u(bde) = 329/15 ≈ 21.93.
For the sake of comparison, we explicitly define other characteristic functions
v1, v2, v3, v4 by the formulas
v1(K) = max
i∈K
min
j∈A\K
h(i, j),
v2(K) =
∑
i∈K
min
j∈A\K
H(i, j),
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v3(K) =
∑
i∈K
min
j∈A\K
h(i, j)H(i, j),
v4(K) =
∑
i∈K
min
j∈A\K
h(i, j).
The table with all values of the characteristic functions u, v1 − v4 in
Example 1 can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 below studies the properties of the Shapley value-based ranking
procedure for the characteristic functions u, v1− v4. For a rigorous proof, we
refer an interested reader to the Appendix.
Theorem 2. The characteristic functions u, v1 − v4 are nonnegative and
monotonous, and the functions v2−v4 also enjoy superadditivity. The Shapley
value-based ranking procedure for the functions u, v1−v4 possesses the properties
presented in the table below.
Satisfaction of the Shapley value properties by the characteristic functions
u, v1 − v4.
Property u v1 v2 v3 v4 Borda Copeland Maximin
Unanimity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Monotonicity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Majority rule no no yes yes yes yes yes no
Condorcet yes yes yes yes no no yes yes
Strong Condorcet no no yes no no no yes no
Compare the results derived in Example 1 with other ranking and winner
definition methods involving tournament matrices (see Klamler 2006). A well-
known ranking technique of m candidates is the Borda rule: a candidate
receives m − 1 points for rank 1, m − 2 points for rank 2, . . . , 0 points for
rank m in a ballot paper. The winner is the candidate having the maximum
total points. For candidate i, the total points have the form∑
j∈A\{i}
h(i, j).
In Example 1, the Borda rule yields the ranking e > a > b > c > d with the
total points of 102, 98, 92, 89 and 69, respectively.
The Copeland method proceeds from points calculated by∑
j∈A\{i}
H(i, j).
In our case, the method brings to the ranking e > a = b = c > d with the
total points of 3, 2, 2, 2 and 1, respectively.
According to the maximin rule, the total points of candidate i are defined
by
min
j∈A\{i}
h(i, j).
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Clearly, we obtain the ranking e > a > c > b > d with the total points of 21,
20, 17, 16 and 12, respectively.
And the Schulze method leads to the ranking e > a > c > b > d.
The Shapley values of the characteristic functions in Example 1.
a b c d e ranking
u 10.994 7.9 9.161 5.306 11.639 e > a > c > b > d
v1 10.95 7.867 9.033 5.367 11.783 e > a > c > b > d
v2 0.917 0.917 1.167 0.583 1.417 e > c > a = b > d
v3 45.05 42.8 49.217 31.05 56.883 e > c > a > b > d
v4 48.633 45.05 45.383 35.3 50.633 e > a > c > b > d
Borda 98 92 89 69 102 e > a > b > c > d
Copeland 2 2 2 1 3 e > a = b = c > d
Maximin 20 16 17 12 21 e > a > c > b > d
Example 2. Consider a situation with m = 3 candidates and n = 2k+1
voters. Imagine that k + 1 voters choose the ranking a > b > c, whereas the
rest k ≥ 1 ones prefer b > c > a.
The preference profile in Example 2.
k + 1 k
a b
b c
c a
Candidate a is the Condorcet winner; however, it beats b and c merely by
the advantage of one vote. Candidate b seems preferable to c for all voters.
The pairwise comparison of all candidates leads to the ranking a > b > c as
the collective decision.
The tournament matrix in Example 2.
a b c
a k + 1 k + 1
b k 2k + 1
c k 0
The table combines the Shapley values for the functions u, v1 − v4. This
example demonstrates that v4 does not obey the Condorcet condition.
The Shapley values of the characteristic functions in Example 2.
u=v1 v2 v3 v4 Borda
a k + 1 11/6 3k + 11/6 13
6
k + 11
6
2k + 2
b k 5/6 2k + 5/6 16
6
k + 5
6
3k + 1
c 0 1/3 k + 1/3 7
6
k + 1
3
k
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Example 3. Consider the case of m = 3 candidates and n = k + 1
voters. Suppose that k ≥ 2 voters choose the ranking a > b > c, and one
voter prefers c > a > b.
The preference profile in Example 3.
k 1
a c
b a
c b
The pairwise comparison of all candidates leads to the unique collective
ranking a > b > c.
The tournament matrix in Example 3.
a b c
a k + 1 k
b 0 k
c 1 1
The table presents the Shapley values for the characteristic functions u, v1−
v4. This example shows that the functions u and v1 do not meet the majority
rule.
The Shapley values of the characteristic functions in Example 3.
u=v1 v2 v3 v4 Borda
a k 11/6 11
6
k + 7
6
11
6
k + 5
6
2k + 1
b 0 5/6 5
6
k + 2
3
5
6
k + 1
3
k
c 1 1/3 1
3
k + 7
6
1
3
k + 11
6
2
Example 4. There are m = 5 candidates and n = 7 voters. Four of them
choose the ranking a > b > c > d > e, and the rest three voters prefer
e > a > b > c > d.
The preference profile in Example 4.
4 3
a e
b a
c b
d c
e d
Adhering to the strong Condorcet condition brings to the collective ranking
a > b > c > d > e and candidate e receives rank 5 (really, it loses to
all opponents under pairwise comparison). Nevertheless, almost half of the
voters assign rank 1 to it. Below, we will demonstrate that candidate e has
higher ranks in other ranking procedures.
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The tournament matrix in Example 4.
a b c d e
a 7 7 7 4
b 0 7 7 4
c 0 0 7 4
d 0 0 0 4
e 3 3 3 3
Example 4 shows that the functions u, v1, v3, and v4 do not satisfy the strong
Condorcet condition.
The Shapley values of the characteristic functions in Example 4.
a b c d e ranking
u = v1 4 0 0 0 3 a > e > b = c = d
v2 2.283 1.283 0.783 0.45 0.2 a > b > c > d > e
v3 13.583 8.083 5.083 3 5.25 a > b > e > c > d
v4 12.983 7.483 4.483 2.4 7.65 a > e > b > c > d
Borda 25 18 11 4 12 a > b > e > c > d
Example 5. To illustrate the obtained results, we consider 2010 FIA
Formula One World Championship. Actually, 27 drivers participated in the
championship and 19 of them gained points. Five drivers competed for the
champion’s title. The championship consisted of 19 races (Grand-Prix), where
10 best drivers earned 25, 18, 15, 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2, and 1 point(s) for the
positions from 1 to 10, respectively. Denote by PS1 this point system. In the
individual event, the points gained at all 19 races were summed up. During
2003–2009 seasons, points were assigned to the first 8 drivers in the final
classification of a race according to the following point system (PS2 ): 10, 8,
6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point(s). The period from 1991 to 2002 was remarkable
for another point system (PS3 ): 10, 6, 4, 3, 2, and 1 point(s). For the sake
of comparison, the table presents the points in the individual event of the
championship counted by these three systems.
2010 FIA Formula One World Championship in the individual event.
Fernando Sebastian Lewis(L) Jenson Mark(M) Individual
Alonso(F) Vettel(S) Hamilton Button(D) Webber event
PS1 252 256 240 214 242 S>F>M>L>D
PS2 101 104 100 87 97 S>F>L>M>D
PS3 81 84 76 61 76 S>F>M>L>D
Clearly, L. Hamilton would occupy the third position in 2010 FIA Formula
One World Championship instead of M. Webber if the organizers preserved
the same point system as in 2009.
The ranking problem of 27 drivers requires bulky computations. Therefore,
let us consider the relative results of the five leading drivers in the championship.
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The relative classification of the five drivers at different races.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
F D S D M M L L S M F M L F F S F S S
L F M L F S D D L L S F M D S M L M L
S L L F S L M F D D L S S S M F D F D
D M D S D F F S F S D D F M D D S L F
M S F M L D S M M F M L D L L L M D M
The tournament matrix for the five drivers.
F S L D M
F 11 10 11 10
S 8 11 12 12
L 9 8 12 10
D 8 7 7 10
M 9 7 9 9
Ranking of the drivers based on pairwise comparison yields a unique
result: F>S>L>D>M.
The relative rank distribution of the five drivers.
Rank F S L D M
1 5 5 3 2 4
2 3 3 6 3 4
3 4 5 4 4 2
4 5 4 1 7 2
5 2 2 5 3 7
Interestingly, the rankings S>F>D and S>F>M result from any point
system, see the table below.
The results shown by the five drivers: a comparison.
F S L D M Ranking
PS1 319 322 305 278 296 S>F>L>M>D
PS2 131 132 127 115 122 S>F>L>M>D
PS3 103 104 95 81 92 S>F>L>M>D
Borda 42 43 39 32 34 S>F>L>M>D
v 1 0 0 0 0 F>S=L=D=M
u=v1 5.633 3.967 3.633 2.8 2.967 F>S>L>M>D
v2 2.283 1.283 0.783 0.45 0.2 F>S>L>D>M
v3 32.5 22.167 17 12.5 10.833 F>S>L>D>M
v4 21.7 21.2 19.033 16.033 17.033 F>S>L>M>D
5. Conclusion.
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This paper has employed cooperative game theory methods to solve the
ranking problem of candidates for a certain position. For this, it is necessary
to construct a characteristic function using the filled ballot papers of voters;
such function defines the payoff of each coalition. The next step is to find
the Shapley value which serves as the ranking method. Note that the stated
ranking procedure takes into account the weight of each candidate in all
possible coalitions. This feature allows applying the ranking procedure for
defining a single winner or several winners (the composition of a certain
committee). And finally, the paper has compared this method with other
well-known candidate ranking procedures.
This research is supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research (project
13-01-00033-a) and the Division of Mathematical Sciences of Russian Academy
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.
The statements on the nonnegativity, monotonicity and superadditivity
of the functions u, v1 - v4 follow directly from their definition. The functions
u and v1 are not superadditive, as illustrated by Example 1.
Let us demonstrate the unanimity property. Suppose that candidate x
is preferable to candidate y for all voters. It suffices to verify the inequality
u(y∪S) ≤ u(x∪S) for any coalition S ⊆ A\{x, y}. Denote K = A\{x, y}\S.
Interestingly, h(i, x) ≤ h(i, y) and h(y, j) ≤ h(x, j) for any i, j. Compare the
payoff matrix of the coalition y ∪ S against x ∪K


x k1 . . . kr
y 0 h(y, k1) . . . h(y, kr)
s1 h(s1, x) h(s1, k1) . . . h(s1, kr)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sl h(sl, x) h(sl, k1) . . . h(sl, kr)


with the payoff matrix of the coalition x ∪ S against y ∪K


y k1 . . . kr
x n h(x, k1) . . . h(x, kr)
s1 h(s1, y) h(s1, k1) . . . h(s1, kr)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sl h(sl, y) h(sl, k1) . . . h(sl, kr)

.
Elements in the lower matrix are not smaller than their counterparts in
the upper one. According to Lemma 2, we have u(y ∪ S) ≤ u(x∪ S). Hence,
for candidate x the Shapley value is not less than for candidate y. For other
characteristic functions under consideration, this property is established by
analogy.
Now, we prove the monotonicity of the ranking procedure. Assume that
in a ballot paper candidate x moves by one position up, whereas candidate y
goes by one position down. Designate by û and v̂i the characteristic functions
resulting from such transformation. Obviously, for any coalition S ⊆ A \
{x, y} the conditions of Lemma 3 hold true. By virtue of Lemma 3, candidate
x (candidate y) does not decrease (increase, respectively) its rank in the
collective preference.
Next, check the Condorcet property. Imagine that candidate x represents
the Condorcet winner and compare it with any other candidate y. The
following inequalities are clear for any coalition S ⊆ A \ {x, y}:
u(x ∪ S) >
n
2
> u(y ∪ S),
v1(x ∪ S) >
n
2
> v1(y ∪ S),
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vi(x ∪ S) > vi(y ∪ S) = 0, i = 2, 3.
Therefore, the Shapley value is higher for candidate x than for candidate y.
Recall that in Example 2 the Condorcet winner does not obtain the maximum
Shapley value in the case of v4.
To proceed, we argue the strong Condorcet property for the function
v2. Let w(x) ⊇ w(y), l(x) ⊆ l(y) and h(x, y) > n/2. Then I(h(i, x) −
n
2
) ≤
I(h(i, y)− n
2
), I(h(y, j)− n
2
) ≤ I(h(x, j)− n
2
) for any i, j. Verify the inequality
v2(y∪S) ≤ v2(x∪S) for any coalition S ⊆ A\{x, y}. DenoteK = A\{x, y}\S.
Similarly to Theorem 1, compare the payoff matrix (3) of the coalition y ∪S
against x∪K with the payoff matrix (4) of the coalition x∪S against y∪K.
Again, observe that elements in the lower matrix are not smaller than
their counterparts in the upper one. Thus and so, we obtain that v2(y∪S) ≤
v2(x ∪ S). Consequently, for candidate x the Shapley value is not less than
for candidate y; this fact proves the strong Condorcet property. Note that
v2(y∪A\{x, y}) < v2(x∪A\{x, y}). In the case of the function v2, candidate x
receives a higher rank than candidate y. Within the framework of Example 4,
the strong Condorcet property fails for the functions u, v1, v3, and v4.
The function v2 enjoys the strong Condorcet property, ergo the majority
rule. Example 3 shows that this property takes no place for u and v1. There
remains one thing to do, i.e., to demonstrate the majority rule for the functions
v3 and v4. Denote by g ≡ v2 the function for the profile consisting of a ballot
paper with the order a1 > a2 > ... > am. Consider any initial profile of size n
and add k > n ballot papers with the order a1 > a2 > ... > am. In this case,
we naturally have
g(S)k ≤ vi(S) ≤ g(S)k + nm, i = 3, 4,
whence it follows that
ϕx(vi)
k
→ ϕx(g), i = 3, 4,
for any candidate x as k →∞. The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
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The characteristic functions v, u, v1 - v4 in Example 1.
K v u v1 v2 v3 v4
∅ 0 0 0 0 0 0
a 0 20 20 0 0 20
b 0 16 16 0 0 16
c 0 17 17 0 0 17
d 0 12 12 0 0 12
e 0 21 21 0 0 21
ab 0 22 22 0 0 38
ac 0.5 346/15 20 0 0 37
ad 0 20 20 0 0 32
ae 0.5 23.5 21 0 0 41
bc 0.5 21.5 18 0 0 35
bd 0 17.5 16 0 0 30
be 0 21 21 0 0 37
cd 0 19 19 0 0 31
ce 1 23 23 1 23 40
de 0.5 329/15 21 0 0 33
abc 0.5 346/15 22 0 0 57
abd 0 22 22 0 0 52
abe 1 26 26 1 26 63
acd 1 24 24 1 24 56
ace 1 27.5 27 1 27 64
ade 0.5 23.5 21 0 0 53
bcd 0.5 21.5 19 0 0 51
bce 1 25 25 2 48 65
bde 0.5 329/15 21 0 0 52
cde 1 23 23 1 23 54
abcd 1 24 24 1 24 78
abce 1 33 33 3 94 111
abde 1 28 28 2 54 91
acde 1 29 29 2 56 88
bcde 1 25 25 2 48 82
abcde 1 45 45 5 225 225
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